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Abstract
Modern technology has given rise to a host of legal and theological questions for Muslims. One such question that 
engaged Muslim scholars since the 1950s was the issue of organ donation. It brought into question and conflict a 
number of ethical teachings such as the value of saving life as opposed to the dignity and honour that should be 
afforded to the dead. The article is based on a small pilot-study comprising themes from interviews with three UK 
muftis.  The resulting conclusion of the article will form the evidence-base for further research into understanding 
perception of organ transplantation and authority among UK Muslim religious professionals (imams, ulama and 
chaplains).
Introduction
Modern technology has given rise to a host of legal and 
theological questions for Muslims (1). One such question 
that engaged scholars in the Muslim world since 1950s 
was the issue of organ transplantation (2). It brought into 
question and conflict a number of ethical teachings such 
as the value of saving life as opposed to the dignity and 
honour that should be afforded to the dead. It pitched 
God’s sovereignty against human autonomy over their 
bodies. The life-saving and death-ridding technology 
gave rise to debates related to exploitation of the weak 
and the utilitarian use of the human body as means to an 
end and not an end in itself.
Scope of the Research
From the outset, it should be mentioned that all 
discussions on organ transplantation in this article refer to 
allotransplant i.e. receiving from and donating to another 
human being. Autotransplant and xenotransplant are not 
the focus of this article as they do not pose much of an 
ethical problem unlike allotransplant. Furthermore, the 
discussion on allotransplant in the case of a living donor 
is only confined to the donation of non-vital organs as 
there is a consensus on the impermissibility of donating 
vital organs (3, 4). Additionally, the article also excludes 
discussion on the transplantation of the male and female 
reproductive glands for both living and cadaver donor 
as the impermissibility of this is also agreed upon (5), 
although some British legal scholars are making a plea 
for Muslim scholars to rethink this position in the case of 
uterus transplant (6). The article is structured such that I 
combine ethico-legal discussions on organ donation with 
data from a small qualitative pilot-study. The resulting 
conclusion of the article will form the evidence-base 
for further research into understanding perception of 
organ transplantation and authority among UK Muslim 
religious professionals (imams, ulama and chaplains). 
Studies have shown that the ulama are the first port of 
call for members of the Muslim community for bioethics 
related issues (7, 8), and any form of intervention in the 
Muslim community would need to start by educating 
the ulama. This study marries the abstract (ethico-legal) 
with practical paradigm (qualitative research) in order 
to give epistemic weight to the daily life practices of 
Muslims in the production of knowledge (9). Thus, I 
take a two-pronged approach. Firstly, a small survey 
of organ donation fatwas issued, and conferences held 
in the Muslim world are discussed. This is followed by 
some discussions on fatwas issued in a British context. 
The survey is not exhaustive and fuller discussions can 
be found in Ghaly (8), Albar (5), Abu Zayd (10) and 
Yaqubi (11). For the purpose of this small study, I have 
confined myself to looking at material from Sunni Islamic 
sources. There is a rich plethora of discussion among 
Shia theologians, which does not constitute the subject 
of this study.  I then supplement this with a small set of 
qualitative data. 
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Research
2The qualitative data collection is based on a small pilot-
study comprising of open-ended interviews with three 
muftis  experienced in bioethical issues conducted during 
the summer of 2016. A qualitative data analysis program 
called Nvivo was used to thematically arrange, code and 
analyze the data. The interview participants were chosen 
based on their training and their knowledge of Islamic law 
and theology. The research was approved by the author’s 
departmental ethics committee and full written consent 
was sought from the interviewees prior to the interview. 
For the purpose of this article, only three themes are 
discussed from the coding frame.    
The findings of this research confirms Rasheed and 
Padela’s (7) study that if meaningful health behaviour 
change intervention on the benefit of organ donation 
through partnering with Muslim scholars is to be 
successful, there needs to be a paradigm shift in how 
Muslim scholars discuss the topic of organ donation. 
Organ Transplantation Fatwas in the Muslim 
World
Organ transplantation is a relatively new phenomenon. 
The modern era of transplantation started in the 1940s 
with an increased medical interest in cornea grafts (12). 
The successful transplantation of a kidney in 1954 
opened up new life-saving horizons hitherto deemed 
impossible. These technological advances caught on 
very quickly in the Muslim world. The first successful 
renal transplantation took place in Jordan in 1972 (13). 
Egypt is seen as the ‘pioneering’ Muslim country in 
transplant medicine (14). Egyptians pride themselves as 
the first Muslim doctors to have direct interaction with 
cornea grafts as early as the 1960s (Ibid., p. 2). A fatwa 
preserved from 1959 is evidence of this. A charitable 
organization for the blind called the ‘Light and Hope 
Foundation’ sought a religious verdict on founding an eye 
bank in Egypt. The then Grand Mufti of Egypt, Shaykh 
Hasan Ma’mun responded to their query by extolling the 
virtues of such an initiative (2, 14). In issuing the fatwa, 
Ma’mun treads with care. He is careful not to offend 
people’s sensitivity towards honouring the dead whilst 
skilfully enumerating the religious and practical needs 
for an eye bank. 
Several high-profile conferences took place from the 
1970s onward on the issue of organ donation. A corollary 
of these international conferences was the birth of a new 
mode of arriving at religious verdicts known as ijtihad 
jama’i (collective ijtihad) (15-17). A question posed to the 
Islamic Fiqh Academy - founded in 1977 and an affiliate 
of the Muslim World League, Mecca, Saudi Arabia – 
from its USA office, resulted in a nine-day conference 
in January 1985 in its 8th session held in Mecca. It was 
concluded that the evidence for the permissibility of 
organ donation was more convincing. The proceedings 
of the conference were published in the first issue of its 
journal Majallat Al-Majma’at al-Fiqhi al-Islami (3). It 
declared that live donation is permissible because there 
is known benefit in it (maslaha), it does not breach the 
dignity of the human body (ihana) and it is considered 
a praiseworthy act. However, the declaration also points 
out that the following conditions must be abided by: 
(1) The donor should not be harmed, (2) The donation 
must be taken with consent, (3) It should be the only 
medical treatment available to save the recipient and (4) 
There must be a high probability of success rate for both 
procuring the organ and transplanting it. It also declared 
that taking an organ from a cadaver donor is a fortiori 
permissible as long as: (a) the deceased was legally 
competent when alive; and (b) proper consent was given 
(3). This high-profile conference became the basis of 
many subsequent conferences and fatwas like the fatwa 
issued by the European Council for Fatwa and Research 
in 2000 discussed below (18). 
It will be disingenuous of me to paint a picture that 
Muslim scholars worldwide were unanimous on the 
permissibility of organ donation. This is not the case. 
Many scholars have opposed organ donation for a variety 
of reasons. However, they are on the whole, a diminishing 
minority. Famous of them all was the celebrated 
Egyptian ‘Shaykh of the People’, Muhammad Mitwalli 
al-Sha’rawi (d. 1998) who led a huge campaign against 
organ harvesting in Egypt (19). Sha’rawi’s argument was 
brilliant in its simplicity. It resonated with the sentiments 
of the lay public. Our bodies do not belong to us; it is a 
trust endowed to us from God. Organ donation trespasses 
the acceptable boundaries of ethical mores; he argued. It 
is sacrilegious and a violation of this trust (14, 19). The 
language of Sha’rawi’s appeal was not rigid and elitist 
like his fellow colleagues in Egypt. His was an argument 
which simply wanted the poor religious people of Egypt 
to connect with God and have faith in Him in the face 
of misery, poverty and illness. For the Egyptian public, 
Sha’rawi’s fiery brimstone preaching confirmed their 
anxiety and suspicion regarding the efficacy of organ 
transplantation. Farmers in Egypt already faced the 
repercussion of consuming crops treated with pesticide 
by government contractors in the form of mass renal 
failure. Furthermore, stories of children kidnapped 
from orphanages to service organ tourists, and missing 
eyeballs of dead relatives preserved in state hospitals left 
a very bitter taste in their mouths.  Invasive technological 
advancements were also viewed as westernization and 
individualization of Egyptian society and an erosion of 
traditional, religious and cultural values (14, 19).
The most relevant opposition to organ donation for UK 
Muslims, given the demographic makeup of Muslims in 
Britain, comes from scholars from South Asia and their 
counterparts in different parts of the world (20-25). In 
his analysis of two fatwas on organ donation: the first on 
prohibition by the Pakistani Mufti Muhammad Shafi (25) 
and the latter on permissibility by the then Grand Mufti 
of Egypt, Shaykh Gad al-Haq, Ebrahim Moosa arrives 
at the conclusion that the differences between the two 
fatwas lie in how human dignity is framed:
3whether it is devotional imperative (ta’abbudi) or whether 
it is bound by its meanings and context (mu’amalaat) so 
that it may change with new contexts (26).
These differences are apertures for deeper systemic and 
structural differences which include legal formalism 
(taqlid) vs. legal eclecticism (talfiq), attitude towards 
the body and its control, the perception of death and 
dying and an understanding that the body is a miniature 
cosmography of the status of society at large. Furthermore, 
South Asian scholars express concern that in the absence 
of  government-supported transplant programs, fatwas on 
the permissibility of organ donation will legitimize the 
demand for organ harvesting the supply of which will 
most certainly come through illegal organ trafficking and 
black market organ trade (25). 
The above discussion on organ donation in the South 
Asian context should not be understood to mean that 
scholars from that region in the world are all against organ 
donation. There are many scholars who argue for the 
permissibility of both cadaveric and live organ donation. 
In fact, Khalid Saifullah Rahmani from the Indian Fiqh 
Academy goes as far as to argue that in life-threatening 
cases, one is able to buy an organ however does not support 
the selling of organs (27). While the above observation is 
true for the state of organ transplantation in developing 
countries (14, 25, 28), would the same concerns apply to 
the UK context? How have fatwas issued in the Muslim 
world impacted on the fatwas of ulama in the UK? Van 
Den Branden and Broeckaert (29) have already carried 
out an in-depth study of 70 English Sunni e-fatwas on 
organ donation and blood transfusion none of which are 
UK-based. Hence, below I briefly discuss three fatwas 
specific to the UK only one of which is an e-fatwa.  
Organ Donation Fatwas in the UK
Mohammed Ghaly’s (8) reading of a fatwa by Zaki 
Badawi suggests the latter’s purposely not engaging or 
referencing fatwas and studies from the Muslim world 
was due to the author’s eagerness to address the concerns 
of British Muslims instead of importing from the Muslim 
world.  In 1995, the UK’s Muslim Law Council led by Zaki 
Badawi issued a fatwa of approval for organ donation 
(30). It was supported by scholars from both Sunni and 
Shia background and three distinguished lawyers and 
must have had an impact on the UK medical community, 
as it warranted notice in the prestigious Journal of 
Medical Ethics (31). In current government campaign for 
educating UK Muslims on the benefits of organ donation, 
the National Health Service still refers back to this fatwa 
(32). Badawi’s fatwa particularly tackled the thorny issue 
of brain-stem death and concluded based on medical and 
religious reasoning that harvesting of organs from brain-
stem death patients is permissible (30). 
A more recent fatwa issue by the European Council for 
Fatwa and Research (ECFR) in its 6th session in 2000 
iterated the declaration of the Islamic Fiqh Academy 
(IFA) in its entirety (18). The ECFR fatwa fails to mention 
any of the dissenting views of the IFA conference 
participants giving the impression that the declaration 
was wholeheartedly accepted by all (8). For example, 
one of the presenters at the IFA conferece, Abu Sunnah 
argued against live organ donation (33). The Saudi Scholar 
Salih b. Fawzan documented his unease with cadaveric 
donation. The Saudi Scholar Bakr Abu Zayd remained 
non-committed (3).   The ECFR fatwa is silent on these 
dissenting views. However, it goes on to make its own 
declarations, which reflect the particulars of a European 
context. Out of these, the one most pertinent to the UK 
context at the moment is the declaration permitting 
deemed consent as a valid form of consent recognized by 
the Shari’a. It is unfortunate that the fatwa presents this 
important point in bullet-form without providing the 
reasoning why it reached this conclusion. The only other 
fatwa permitting deemed consent is an old Kuwaiti fatwa 
issued in 1980. However, that fatwa was rejected both 
by the Kuwaiti ministry of Health as well as the Kuwaiti 
Parliament (5). 
While the above two fatwas subscribe to a permissive 
attitude towards organ donation, a more ambivalent 
position can be observed in a third fatwa by the Indian 
Deobandi Mufti, Muhammad Ibn Adam al-Kawthari 
(34). In response to a questioner seeking a fatwa on organ 
donation, al-Kawthari presents the arguments for both 
prohibition and permission. He writes, 
The views of the contemporary scholars are based upon 
the general and broad guidelines of Shariah. It is obvious 
that this will result in difference of opinion, thus no one 
opinion should be condemned, as the intention of all 
the scholars is to please Allah, and live a life that is in 
accordance with Shariah’ (34). 
Be that as it may, subtle hints can be found for al-
Kawthari’s preferred position. Al-Kawthari makes it a 
point to mention that his teacher the Pakistani Mufti, 
Muhammad Taqi Uthmani decided not to pronounce 
on the topic given that Uthmani’s father; Mohammed 
Shafi has already presented evidence for its prohibition. 
Furthermore, al-Kawthari’s advice to those who adopt 
the position of permissibility is indicative of his leaning. 
One may follow any of the above two viewpoints, as they 
are both from great scholars of Islam. If one acts on the 
view of permissibility, then it would be advisable, as a 
precautionary measure, to seek forgiveness from Allah 
(istigfar) and donate something in charity’ (34). 
From the forgoing brief survey of three UK based 
fatwas, the following observations can be made: (a) The 
transnational nature of Islamic bioethical deliberations 
(8), (b) how authority is constructed, (c) the role of 
context in shaping the contours of a fatwa. Ghaly argues 
that further research is required to observe the impact of 
these fatwas on the Muslim community in the West (8). 
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In addition to looking at fatwas on organ transplantation 
in the UK context, understanding the views of UK scholars 
vis-à-vis organ transplantation will help gauge the level 
of engagement with these fatwas and how authority is 
constructed. Below are discussions on three themes 
(organ donation, organ reception and construction of 
authority) extrapolated from interviews I conducted with 
three UK muftis during the summer of 2016. The data-
set is deliberately small as the results of the interviews are 
to form the evidence-base for a larger project. All three 
muftis either are born in the UK or have citizenship status. 
Given the South Asian background of a sizeable number 
of UK Muslims, the three muftis chosen for the interviews 
reflect this demographic background. Two of them 
conform to the Deobandi strand of Islam and the other 
to the Barelwi school of thought. Their names have been 
anonymized to protect their identity and pseudonyms 
have been used throughout the article.
The two Deobandi scholars, Mufti Abu Zayd and Mufti 
Abu Bakr, completed the Dars-i Nizami syllabus in a UK 
Darul Uloom.  The Dars-i Nizami syllabus founded by 
Mulla Nizamuddin (d. 1748) of the Farangi Mahall in India 
in 1695, comprised of a fine balance between the rational 
sciences (ma’qulat) and the revealed sciences (manqulat) 
(35-37). It went through a number of permutations and 
the final standardised version has been adopted in the 25 
or so Darul Ulooms in the UK. After completing their 
UK studies, the two Deobandi Muftis enrolled on to 
fatwa training programmes in Pakistan. Mufti Aslam on 
the hand studied the Dars-i Nizami and other modules 
privately with scholars in the UK and abroad (not South 
Asia) including a stint in the Middle East. This is as 
much as can be said about the scholars generally. Further 
particulars are below. After completing his fatwa course, 
Mufti Abu Zayd went into researching and issuing 
fatwas formally. He also worked as a hospital chaplain 
in a multifaith team and came face to face with ethically 
challenging situations in his everyday work. Mufti Abu 
Zayd sits on the advisory panel on a number of Shari’a 
boards and has been consulted by the UK Government 
on a number of issues related to Islam and public health. 
Mufti Aslam is a trained medical doctor and author. He 
has been consulted on several occasions by Muslim and 
non-Muslim groups to discuss Islam and health related 
issues. Mufti Abu Bakr is the youngest of my interviewees. 
After graduating from the mufti training programme, he 
became a full-time imam in a mosque and has ever since 
been doing so. His exposure to some of the real life ethical 
challenges is limited to what people divulge to him by way 
of seeking religious guidance. 
Perception on Donating Organs
The first of the three themes identified in the coding 
frame is their perception on donating organs as opposed 
to receiving one. One of the main arguments used against 
the permissibility of organ donation by Sha’rawi and 
Shafi is that humans are not the owners of their body 
(25). It is given to them by God as a trust which is to be 
used responsibly but with limited autonomy. All three 
interviewees felt that in the case of a living donor, God’s 
ownership is not violated by donating an organ. This came 
with the caveat that risk is minimal to the donor and that 
she can lead a healthy life after the surgery. 
In the case of cadaver donation, their views were not in 
unison. Abu Bakr deemed it impermissible to retrieve 
organs from dead people. Abu Zayd believed that organ 
donation is only permissible from ‘non-beating heart 
donors’ but not permissible from brain-stem death 
patients. Finally, Aslam maintained that all forms of organ 
retrieval are permissible from dead donors. 
What is the underlying reasoning for their differences? 
Abu Bakr’s argument anchors on two points. The first is the 
common argument that the body is a trust from God who 
has loaned it to humans to use with certain restrictions. 
He argues that to ingest prohibited food items like pork is 
deemed as a violation of this trust. In similar vein, suicide 
and donating organs is also a violation of this trust. For 
Abu Bakr the extent of fair-use of the body terminates 
with death. 
This argument betrays circular reasoning for he is 
presenting as evidence the very thing he is trying to 
prove. It is also contradictory since Abu Bakr believes 
that blood transfusion and live organ donation is allowed. 
When queried about this contradiction he responded that 
his main hesitation with cadaver organ donation hinges 
on a Prophetic statement that the dead feel pain. While 
a living person can alleviate pain through aesthetic, he 
argues, what pain control measures are available for the 
deceased? He says, 
How can you be sure that you won’t feel pain and 
therefore regret your decision? On what religious text are 
your basing your opinion on that you will be okay in front 
of Allah on the day of Judgment.  It’s not just an ethical 
issue, that if you donate you have mercy and if you do not 
donate then you don’t have mercy. Sometimes our Shari’a 
is hundred percent not understood by logic, it’s what God 
has stipulated for us. (Interview with Abu Bakr interview 
August 2016).
Abu Bakr is taking a cautious approach. Any action 
apparently violating the overall sanctity of the human 
bestowed upon her by God through scriptural mandate 
requires divine writ to overrule it. In the absence of 
any such scripture the status quo must be maintained. 
However, the real question is whether organ donation 
fares as a concrete example of violation of this sanctity? 
Furthermore, should metaphysical issues such as pain in 
the spiritual realm need to bear down on legal issues?
5For Abu Zayd, the question of ownership of the body is a 
non-issue. He believes that the entire discussion on organ 
donation anchors on how human dignity is perceived. 
However, what is interesting about Abu Zayd’s view is 
that he does not believe that in this particular instance the 
Shari’a defines dignity or what constitutes a breach of it. 
For him, the matter is left to the Muslim society (urf) to 
decide. He says,
What I would say, from my reading of the whole area, all 
dalail (evidence) for and against the rest of it boils down 
to the dignity of man… So a lot of that (when the Qur’an 
and hadith are silent) it tends to be left on urf (society). 
So an urf changes with time and place. So, something 
that was deemed to be dishonorable yesterday could 
be honorable today; there are examples of this. So, the 
question is, ‘is organ donation today seen to be honorable 
or dishonorable, does it desecrate the body or does it not’? 
I think when it comes to live donors, whether it’s bone 
marrow or whether its kidney, if you hear that somebody 
has donated their kidney to their brother, for example, 
the natural reaction to that is not one of horror but one 
of amazement and admiration, wow! Nobody looks at it 
and says “Oh my God what has he done” that tends to 
be the general perception. That’s what I would say for 
live donors. It’s not viewed as dishonorable. …  Then if 
you take that one step further, if you take a kidney and 
you take other organs, the heart, the liver, the lungs etc. 
when does that kind of become desecration? And I tend to 
ask the question, if you consider this is your mother who 
has died, and they are going to remove her heart, lungs 
etc. how does one feel about that? When does it reach 
a level where it becomes desecration? Okay what about 
external features, nose, eyes, and cornea. Is it just internal 
features or external features? That is an area where I need 
to conduct further research. (Interview with Abu Zayd 
July 2016).
Abu Zayd’s position is interesting since it is suggestive 
of the possibility that as the Muslim community becomes 
familiar with the benefits of organ transplantation and 
reaps its benefits, it will be more susceptible in not 
viewing organ harvesting as aggression towards the 
person and be more accepting of it. For him, the Muslim 
community is not ready to palate any form of invasive 
meddling with a dead body. 
As for why Abu Zayd does not pronounce a fatwa of 
permissibility for brain-stem death donation. He argues 
that he is not convinced that brain-stem death is real death 
since it does not conform with Islamic understanding 
of death, which is the exiting of the soul from the body 
marked by a complete cessation of cardiopulmonary 
activity (38). Furthermore, it is disputed among medical 
ethicist whether brain-stem death is real death and certain 
psychosomatic activities similar to that of a healthy 
person remains even when the person is deemed brain-
stem dead (22, 39). 
Mufti Aslam had the most intriguing argument. 
Commenting on brain-stem death, he argues that trying 
to pinpoint the exact moment of death is a red herring. 
The departing of the soul from the body is purely a 
metaphysical issue which cannot be gauged with any 
machine. So, the only thing at our disposal is legal death. 
He maintains that in the life of a person there will arrive 
a point of no return when widespread cellular death 
occurs, and no amount of medical intervention will be 
able to resuscitate the person. ‘The light is on but no one 
is at home.’ It is a machine which is artificially pumping 
oxygen around the body and keeping the heart beating. 
However, there is no consciousness and the person is no 
more. 
Through the use of legal logic, he develops a strong case 
for retrieval of organs due to death caused by neurological 
criteria. He argues that this is the exact moment when 
scholars permit the removal of assisted ventilation devices 
(40). Moving from this premise, he extends the logic by 
arguing that lungs are the internal ventilators of the body. 
If one is able to stop the ventilator, then why not take 
the lungs out which are the internal ventilator, he argues. 
Clearly, Aslam does not seem to see any qualitative 
difference between switching off the life-support machine 
and procuring an organ to stop the breathing. One may 
argue that one is passive non-invasive termination of the 
body and the other is active invasive ending of life and 
therefore warrants a distinction.    
Perception on Receiving Organ and 
Necessity (darura)
The forgoing discussion was from the point of view of 
the donor. What about from the point of view of the 
recipient? All three scholars were of the opinion that it is 
permissible due to the necessity (darura) of saving one’s 
life. The darura principle is invoked in order to override 
an otherwise categorical prohibition in scripture (41). 
However, there is significant disagreement in how darura 
is interpreted and applied. Is it an actual necessity or can 
it be described as potential necessity? For example, an 
organ for instance may not immediately develop in to 
an actual life-threatening condition. However prolonged 
malfunction may have a knock-on effect. In the end 
a cumulative condition can be described as actual life 
threatening situation as a result of multiple organ failures 
(26).
For Abu Bakr it is always actual necessity as opposed to 
potential necessity which counts. He side-stepped my 
question on whether it is permissible to use organs from 
cadaver donors in an actual life-threatening situation. 
He argued that it is permissible for the patient to receive 
the organ without questioning its provenance. In other 
words, he accepted the demand without commenting on 
the supply.  
Both Abu Zayd and Aslam are of the opinion that necessity 
is both actual as well as potential. Abu Zayd says, 
6  Now if you look at the terminology of the fuqaha (jurists), 
one is the case of idtirar (emergency), and idtirar tends 
to be used where a life is threatened. They are all about 
saving a life. Some say that darura is synonymous with 
idtirar so it has to be life threatening. But if you look at 
the usage of the fuqaha, its tends to be wider application 
of darura. And so it’s not only about threatening of life. 
For me a vital function of the body will also be darura. 
You can call it what you want. Qualifying need would be 
where you are restoring the normal function of a body or 
saving a life. Saving a life, okay, but restoring the function 
of a body. So for example in this situation nowhere you 
have a person who’s had diabetes and if he was to have 
a transplant, for me that will qualify as a darura already, 
irrespective of what is to happen in the future. (Interview 
with Abu Zayd, July 2016) 
Aslam further extends this argument. He poses the 
question whether darura is about immediacy, understood 
as ‘time bound’ or whether darura is about the ‘certainty 
of occurrence’. He argues for the latter option and laments 
that thinking about necessity as immediate and time-
bound is individualization of an issue without looking 
at the greater picture. By way of example he mentions a 
scenario where a group of people were starting off on a 
desert expedition. At the entrance to the desert they find 
a casket of beer. Would it be permissible for the group 
to take this casket of beer with them just in case their 
water runs out? Aslam’s reasoning is that it’s about the 
immediacy that brings about a certainty. Moving on from 
this example he makes the point that once one looks 
beyond their individual selves they will see that that 
there is a perpetual need for organs. He says that in the 
life-time of a preserved cornea-tissue, statistically there 
is a hundred percent chance that someone will need that 
tissue. The implication of Abu Zayd and Aslam’s opinion 
is far reaching. If darura is to include potential necessity 
in addition to actual necessity, this opens up doors to 
legitimizing organ banks. 
The darura argument is invoked when there is a tension 
between a specific command of God (nass) and His 
general purpose (hikma) extrapolated from the specific 
text (41). By default, the over-ridden text is one of 
prohibition and the darura-principle is invoked in order to 
temporarily legitimize the action. For Aslam, to start the 
discussion on organ donation from the position of darura 
is a false premise. He argues that since there is statistical 
certainty that someone somewhere will always require 
an organ, the default position should shift from one of 
accommodation to that of permissibility from the outset.  
Aslam complains that the advocates of organ donation 
are bad at promoting their position by classifying it 
as a mere permissibility. Out of the five legal norms 
(obligatory (wajib), recommended (mandub), permissible 
(mubah), disliked (makruh) and prohibited (haram)) 
used in Islamic legal theory to classify all actions by the 
legally competent person (42), organ donation oscillates 
between the prohibited (haram) and neutral (mubah/
halal) positions with all scholars maintaining prohibition 
as the default position. Aslam makes the point that in the 
mind of an ordinary person, considering the emotional 
and psychological tension between an act that may 
be prohibited or merely permissible, it is always the 
prohibited that tilts the scale. He argues that since there 
is widespread need of organs on the level of certainty 
arrived through statistical data; no longer can the issue be 
viewed through strict legal lens. An argument from virtue-
ethics need to be made where the default position starts 
from ‘permissible’ moving towards ‘recommended’, 
which will include acts of charity, acts of worship, acts of 
preservation of humanity and gradually crouch towards 
the ‘obligatory’. Aslam maintains that organ donation 
does not only fulfil the broader objective of the Shari’a 
relating to preservation of the self, but interestingly it 
also fulfils a second objective related to the preservation 
of religion.  The broader objectives of the Shari’a are 
universal principles the preservation of which is the 
raison d’être of the Shari’a (Opwis 2005, 2017). They 
include: the preservation of religion, life, honor, rational 
faculty, wealth and progeny. All of these principles have 
further categorization depending on their urgency and 
importance. These are known as the levels of gravity 
(maratib al-masalih): They are vital necessities (darura), 
valued interest (hajah) and supplementary interests 
(tahsin) (Opwis 2017, 10). Aslam argues that if one was 
to be given a second chance to live through receiving 
an organ, one will have many more years to find God or 
to repent from their sins. It is only when such forceful 
ethical claims are made that Aslam believes people will 
start responding to organ donation properly.
Organ Transplantation and Religious 
Authority   
The above two themes give the impression that a 
compelling and convincing ethico-legal discussion may 
prove to be decisive when it comes to deciding whether 
organ donation and transplantation should be allowed or 
not. However, the two British fatwa discussed above (The 
ECFR 2000 and al-Kawthari 2004 fatwas) demonstrate the 
transnational characteristics of such fatwas and how UK 
ulama are relying on the fatwas issued in the Muslim world 
for guidance. The interview participants also agreed with 
this view and accepted that at least for the British ulama 
and by extension, the UK Muslim community it is not 
theological arguments that will sway their opinions but 
what elderly authorities (akabir ulama) from their sphere 
of influence have pronounced on the issue. Commenting 
on the efficacy of international Islamic law organizations 
for UK Muslims, Abu Zayd says, 
To be honest for the people from the Indian Sub-continent, 
the Majma’at al-Fiqhi al-Islami can say whatever they 
want, but if Mufti Taqi Uthmani says one thing the whole 
of the sub-continent is fine with it. Do you understand. 
So, it’s who you have trust in your particular manhaj 
(religious affiliation). (Interview with Abu Zayd, July 
2016).      
7The other two interviewees concurred with this view. Abu 
Bakr went to the extent to say that if Mufti Muhammad 
Taqi Uthmani issued a fatwa of permissibility for organ 
donation, he and many other Deobandi scholars residing 
in the UK will immediately follow suit. 
One of the reasons for this may be the lack of expertise or 
lack of confidence among UK ulama to carry out intensive 
research on a local level, which may overturn the fatwas 
issued in the Muslim world. In answer to my question 
relating to who the most qualified ulama on bioethical 
issues are in the UK, Aslam responded that bioethics is 
a massively underdeveloped field and the UK ulama do 
not have access to proper resources. He argued that the 
ulama in the UK are too general in their knowledge and 
there needs to be a professionalization of the ulama class 
where they can specialize in specific areas of research. 
Abu Zayd also said something along similar lines,
It’s all second hand, third hand information, its exposure, 
so and so has written this. They won’t have any books on 
medical ethics. […] Unless they are going to academia 
and developing their expertise and have some kind of 
influence otherwise, they don’t go past Bukhari and the 
sad thing is if the whole system is like that it stops there 
and that’s it. (Interview with Abu Zayd, July 2016).      
Conclusion 
One of the limitations of this study is the small data-
set employed to make observations. The data captured 
three differing views towards organ donation and two 
towards organ reception. Further research is required 
to ascertain whether this is a trend among UK ulama. 
Furthermore, a more extensive data-set will reveal if there 
is any shift or leaning towards any one particular view. By 
thematically coding and analyzing the data using Nvivo, 
what immediately became apparent is the non-scriptural 
arguments that respondents made. In the absence of clear 
scriptural evidence, the respondents employed a form 
of eisegesis where they projected their understanding of 
what it means to be a human, and how death and dying 
is to be conceived. Their personal biography is a factor 
in their decision making. Fatwas and religious opinions 
are socially constructed to fit a particular understanding 
of the human vis a vis God and his relation to religion. 
At times this understanding emanates from an anxiety 
over pronouncing on something about which the Shari’a 
has provided no direct guidance. Other times it’s related 
to how society translates dignity and desecration. A 
narrowly scientific understanding of death is presented as 
a counter-argument to its metaphysical aspects. Looking 
beneath the surface of the discussion on organ donation, 
one realizes that it falls at the intersection of the ethico-
legal and the anthropological. What appears to be, at 
first blush, scripturally informed arguments are in reality 
filtered through certain sociological attitude towards 
death and dying.   
The sociologist Bryan Turner (43) argues that people 
conceptualize the body in two ways: the first is through 
embodiment i.e. human beings have a body and possess 
a body; and secondly through enselvment that human 
beings are a body. The idea that humans have bodies is 
based on a Cartesian distinction between the soul/person 
and the body, which regards the body as simply a machine 
directed by the instructions of the soul (44). The body as 
a machine and therefore a conglomeration of disparate 
interchangeable body parts is a view compatible with 
organ transplantation and one generally advocated by 
certain groups such as doctors (45). However, studies have 
shown that the more integrated body parts are to the idea 
of personhood, the more sacred they are considered and 
less likely to be donated. The idea is in part based on how 
we view our ‘body image’ which may not necessarily have 
any relation to biological facticity but can be influenced 
by history, tradition and custom. In Islam there is an 
intimate connection between the body and the soul and 
the belief that both body and soul will be resurrected on 
Judgment Day, which explains why there is much anxiety 
around the subject of organ donation (46).  
In addition to the above, certain fatwas have had an 
influential grasp, first and foremost on British ulama and 
by extension on the UK Muslim community. For UK 
Deobandi ulama, Shafi’s 1967 fatwa issued in Pakistan is 
viewed as the final say on the subject which can only be 
overturned by an authority of similar credibility like his 
son Taqi Uthmani. The Barelwis take as their authority the 
fatwa of Mufti Akhtar Reza Khan (23) the great grandson 
of the veritable founder of the movement Ahmad Reza 
Khan. If any successful intervention is to be had by 
employing the services of UK ulama, a number of steps 
need to be taken on the theological front (as opposed to 
the community engagement front).  Step 1 is to highlight 
the local as opposed to the transnational nature of fatwas 
issued in the Muslim world. A thorough re-reading and 
interrogation of fatwas issued on the topic in the Muslim 
world need to be undertaken. These are to be studied in 
such a way that they are not only filtered through the lens 
of theology and law, but also by investigating the cultural, 
social and political contexts in which these fatwas were 
written in and then decide whether they mirror their 
ground reality in the UK or not.  
Step 2 will include ruminating on the style of delivery. 
What is gleaned from Abu Bakr and Abu Zayd’s interview 
data is how society is to view the human body. Since death 
and dying are delicate subjects and handling a deceased 
family member is fraught with emotions, an approach 
that is sensitive to this will go a long way. Rigid scientific 
arguments like Aslam’s position on brain-death may fall 
on deaf ears, however his argument for a shift in the 
discourse on organ donation may prove to successful. If 
proponents of organ donation are to get traction for their 
view, they radically need to change their discourse from 
one of mere permissibility (mubah) to a nomenclature 
which connects with the everyday concerns of people 
using non-technical simple language; a language that 
argues for organ donation from the point of view of not 
only law and ethics but virtue, charity and reward.  
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